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Jones et al.: The New Biology and the Law

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
VOL. XXI

SPRING 1969

NO. 4

THE NEW BIOLOGY AND THE LAW*
Moderator: Professor Ernest M. Jones, College of Law, University of
Florida. We have a panel of very distinguished scholars here to discuss
various facets of the topic, and I will introduce them to you in just a moment.
First, however, let me acquaint you with the program of the seminar. The
first portion will consist of presentations by each member of the panel.
During the second portion, questions and comments by the panelists and by
members of the audience will be invited.
To economize on time, instead of introducing each panelist immediately
before his presentation I am going to introduce all panelists now and in the
order in which they will make their presentations. Hence, as each panelist
leaves the podium his successor will follow without further introduction. So
that the audience can fix identities, will each of the panelists stand briefly
for a moment when I speak his name during his introduction.
Our first panelist will be Dr. Rene Dubos, Professor, The Rockefeller
University - a microbiologist, experimental pathologist, scientific investigator,
lecturer, and author. His achievements in each of these roles are so numerous
and outstanding that were I to attempt even the briefest reference to them
I would preempt the time of the panelists. Just as a sample of his achievements, however, let me list the titles of the books he has published: The Torch
of Life; The Unseen World; The Dreams of Reason; Pasteur and Modern
Medicine; Mirage of Health; Bacterial and Mycotic Infections of Man; Biochemical Determinants of Microbial Disease; The White Plague- Tuberculosis; Man and Society; Louis Pasteur- Freelance of Science; The Bacterial
Cell; Health and Disease: Man, Medicine and Environment; and So Human
an Animal, for which he won a Pulitzer Prize. Dr. Dubos will focus his
presentation on the ethical problems now being posed by modem biology.
Our second panelist will be the Honorable Warren E. Burger, Judge,
United States Court of Appeals, Washington, D. C. Judge Burger is a former
law professor and lecturer at American and European law schools. He has
practiced law for twenty-two years, served as assistant Attorney General of
the United States, and has contributed frequently to legal periodicals. He
has been among the vanguards of legal minds trying to think through the
implications of the new biology for law and legal process.
*A seminar presented at the dedication of the Spessard E. Holland Law Center, February
1, 1969. The seminar consists of remarks by Dr. Rene Dubos, Judge Warren E. Burger, confirmed as Chief Justice of the United States on June 9, 1969, Dr. Emil Mantini, Dr. Samuel
P. Martin, and Professor Marcus L. Plant. These remarks were transcribed from a tape
recording.
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Our third panelist will be Dr. Emil Mantini, Assistant Professor, Division
of Thoracic and Cardiovascular Surgery, University of Florida. Dr. Mantini
has served as chief of surgery for the Veterans' Administration Hospital in
Gainesville, Florida; has made important contributions to medical literature;
and he will supply the insight of an expert medical specialist to the seminar.
Our fourth panelist will be Dr. Samuel P. Martin, Professor of Medicine
and Provost, J. Hillis Miller Health Center, University of Florida. On
occasions too numerous to mention, Dr. Martin has served as a consultant to
national and state governmental bodies that are concerned with health problems. He has been honored many times by memberships and important
offices in a variety of professional societies. He has produced a steady stream
of contributions to medical literature since 1943 and in the process he has
accumulated a bibliography of publications of truly impressive proportions.
Finally, he is acknowledged in his discipline as a thoroughly competent
administrator in medical education.
Our fifth panelist will be Marcus L. Plant, Professor of Law, School of
Law, University of Michigan. Since receiving a J.D. degree from the University of Michigan in 1938 he practiced law in Wisconsin until 1944 and in New
York City from 1944-1946; he has been a member of the faculty of the University of Michigan Law School since 1946. Professor Plant is the University of
Michigan Faculty Representative to the Intercollegiate Big Ten Conference.
Law and medicine is a teaching and research specialty and he is recognized as
a national authority in the field.
Dr. Rene Dubos. I shall try in the next twenty minutes to give you a
short course in modern biology and, to make it very short, I shall organize
my remarks around two themes that are interrelated and complementary. The
two themes are the uniqueness of the individual human being, and the
dependence of each individual human being on the social order. First: What
do we mean by uniqueness of human beings? This, of course, has been the
credo of humanists for at least two or three thousand years, perhaps more.
What have biologists brought to bear on this ancient topic?
What biologists have done is to demonstrate that which everybody, I
believe, knew before biologists began to work on the subject: namely, that
each human being is unique, unprecedented, and irreplacable. Each human
being is unique because he possesses an array of genes that he inherits from
his parents, which is unique, which has not occurred before, which will
probably never occur again, and which is not duplicated at the present time
- except in the very special case of identical twins. And even in the case of
identical twins there is no doubt, as I shall have occasion to develop later,
that genetic identity does not make for identity of individuality, because, in
fact, genetic traits, contrary to what people assume, do not determine what a
person will become in the course of his life. Genetic endowments only act
in such a manner as governing, conditioning the responses of that person
to the environmental forces that infringe on him in the course of his development. And since environmental forces are never the same for two persons,
even identical twins turn out to be different persons. It is for this reason,
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in fact, that each individual human being not only is unique, but is unprecedented. Neither the gene array nor the conditions have ever been the same in
the past as they are now, and are irreplacable because we can be sure that
the conditions under which we develop now are different from those that will
prevail in the future.
But after considering the uniqueness of each person, we must place the
person in the social environment under which he develops and then we realize
that, most certainly, many aspects of ethics and, I believe, even of law,
originated not from concern with the individual, but rather from the kind
of behavior that was best suited to the survival of the social group. If I may
restate this view in a more colloquial form, I would say that good manners
of prehistoric man - good manners that were determined by the conditions
necessary for survival in the group - have become woven, so to speak, in the
very biological fabric of each individual human being so that in a peculiar
way the summation of personality must involve biologically those determinants that are essential for social survival.
Now to turn to what appear to be more practical and immediate problems, those that a surgeon has to deal with: When does he decide that a person
is sufficiently dead - it is on purpose that I use this phrase - that it is
justifiable to remove . an organ from him for the sake of transplantation?
If we face this problem we realize that we have to concern ourselves with the
definition of the end of life. And in fact, defining the cessation of life also
involves becoming concerned with the beginning of life.
In theory, the fertilized ovum is potentially capable of developing into
full
organism if placed in suitable media and incubated under the proper
a
conditions. Moreover, in theory also, any cell taken from an organism that
only appears to be dead and that retains certain characteristics can be made
to recreate the whole developmental organization of that creature. Now that
sounds a bit overstated, and yet is not; because, in fact, it has now been shown
possible to take any kind of cell from the root of a tomato or tobacco plant
and make that cell grow under certain controlled conditions in such a manner
that the whole plant will be reconstituted. "Well," you may say, "this is a
plant; it is not man." Admittedly, it is not man, but very recently as some of
you may have read in the newspaper - and this is one case where the newspaper accounts are quite correct - a group of English biologists has succeeded
in obtaining a frog or a number of frogs that have developed from cells
isolated from the animal. So we certainly have the theoretical knowledge,
even though not yet the practical knowledge, to recreate a human being out
of cells taken, for example, from a human being. Now that has an enormous
relevance to all sorts of practical problems. Think, for example, of trying
to decide at what time the embryo, the human embryo, is alive. The embryo
is alive from the moment of conception. So that, in theory, one can make
the embryo develop into a complete human being. At the present time we
know only enough to keep the embryo alive when it is somewhere near twentyeight weeks old, but this is only an expression of deficient technical knowledge,
not an expression of theoretical possibility. At the present time, we can feel
confident that the human body that is dead, according to all the criteria that
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we accept, still has cells that can be made to develop into a complete human
being. Clearly, we are faced here with a number of theoretical possibilities for
the future that are extremely disturbing. But fortunately, the practical man,
whether he is a physician or a judge, has to act on the basis of the state of
the art at a given time. So that he need not concern himself with these
potentialities of the future, but the future usually comes very much faster
than we expect, and I would not be surprised if many of you in this room
will some day have to make decisions on the basis of those theoretical possibilities that I outlined.
Now, just a few words to try to define what we mean by "the sanctity of
life." One thing certain is that no human being can exist alone. Man cannot
develop physically and mentally, nor can he retain his physical and mental
health unless he functions as a member of a highly organized social group.
So that in order to obey rules of conduct based on the concept of the sanctity
of life, it is necessary to take into consideration not only the values that pertain
to the uniqueness of the individual person but also all the imperatives that
derive from the fact that man cannot survive except as part of a group and
that the survival of the group should depend upon certain restraints imposed
on man, on the individual person.
This leads me to another area of biological knowledge that bears directly,
I believe, upon the concept of freedom. I think I could, if I had time, develop
a concept of freedom based upon the biological dimensions of freedom: its
potentialities and constraints. We all know that it is now possible to condition
and manipulate human beings in such a manner that their behavior can be
transformed either by drugs or by conditioning techniques. I believe Dr.
Martin intends to speak about the subject so I shall not discuss it further.
But, what I want to emphasize is that the mentality of one individual human
being has always been in the past, is now, and will continue to be manipulated
by all sorts of social matters of which we are not aware: namely, parental
training, taboos, education, customs. The fact is that, at any given time, the
behavior of human beings is shaped by social influences. This is particularly
true during the early years of development, during the period of gestation,
and also during the first two or three years of life - a time at which all the
physical characteristics, all the mental characteristics of the developing child
are shaped by biological and social forces that impinge on him. So that in
reality, when we speak of freedom we must always realize that biological
freedom operates with what has been built into the organism by the forces
that act on him and that shape him during development.
On the basis of all these somewhat broad, but nevertheless well-defined,
biological considerations I believe that one could arrive at a new kind of
analysis of the problems of morality, which I have briefly outlined here under
the concept of "individual versus statistical morality." The Hippocratic Oath,
which is the oath by which all physicians function, is concerned exclusively
with the rights, freedoms, and personal relationships of physicians and patients. But in fact, anthropologists have revealed that attitudes toward all
these problems differ profoundly from one society to the other, even attitudes
toward death differ from one population to the other. But more important
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for our society is the fact that the Hippocratic Code of Ethics was formulated
at a time when medical action affected only the individual patient and his
immediate family. In contrast, practically all modern biomedical technology
can affect the population as a whole and, indeed, can affect successive generations so that the very effectiveness of modem medicine will require that
individual morality be supplemented by what I call statistical morality, an
attitude concerned not only with the welfare of the patient or his immediate
family but also with the good of the population at large, now and in the
future. I will mention only one example to illustrate what a very practical
situation that this poses for us. One of the most effective techniques of
medicine is vaccination against smallpox. There is nothing that has more
importance for the health of man than smallpox vaccinations. It has been so
effective that at the present time smallpox is no longer a problem in any of
the modern technological societies. And for this reason, many persons claim
we must give up, abandon mass vaccinations against smallpox. And we must
give it up for an excellent reason, for however well controlled smallpox vaccination is, the fact is that a fair number of vaccinated persons, especially
children, will suffer from a disease called postvaccinal encephalytis and in a
year a significant number of pathology results from vaccinations. Even though,
as I said before, smallpox itself has all but disappeared from Western civilization, there is no doubt that when we vaccinate a child in the United States
or Europe against smallpox we are killing, every year, a large number of
children. We are doing it for the sake of society- we are doing it because
we know that if we did abandon smallpox vaccinations it is almost certain
that smallpox would again become a tremendous problem in our society
and would kill many thousands and millions of people. There is one situation
where interest of the individual, in this case the child, must be sacrificed to
the good of society, and we have accepted it. I am convinced that we are
going to face such a dilemma throughout the biomedical profession and the
law in the immediate future.
So that, as you sense, I regard the ethical issues created by modern
biology as originating from the necessitated course of two complementary
aspects of human life: the right of the individual person, and the needs of
the community from which he derives his physical and mental sustenance. On
the one hand, we must provide for the individual person as wide a range of
environmental stimuli as possible to allow a person to express his potentialities. On the other hand, if we do that, then we certainly create a kind of
biological disorder, if I may say, in society. We certainly create conditions
that destroy social coherence. So that we are faced with this most cruel of
all dilemmas that if we want to give each developing child the most complete
chance to express all of his potentialities we create a situation that is, in the
long run, destructive to society.
Here we can perhaps take some comfort from what is learned by contemplating the evolution of this interplay between the individual and society.
There is no doubt that in all animals in society there is a highly organized
biological structure where each animal has his place in the system. In most
types of archaic societies, human societies, there is also a highly organizcd
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structure. This is what accounts for the beautiful social quality of Ruth
Benedict's Patterns of Culture where she shows how each one of the Indian
societies had a highly developed structure within which each person had to
function. As societies become more complex and more involved, like ours,
this pattern, this structure begins to dissolve. This has the advantage of
giving to many more of us the chance to express what there is in us, to develop
our individuality according to our wishes; but this also creates a large number
of problems for societies; and beyond a certain point this kind of freedom
of development unquestionably would result in the destruction of society.
I happen to believe that it is worth taking the trouble, and that in the
long run the more freedom one gives for individual development, the greater
the chance that there will emerge from human endeavors the qualities that
have given such an extraordinary richness to human civilization.
Judge Warren E. Burger. Dr. Dubos has spoken eloquently, both as a
scientist and, if I may say so, as a philosopher in this area. My assignment
here is briefly to point up some factors on the external controls to which he
has alluded, which society as a group must place upon some individuals for
the protection of both the individual and the group.
The problem of ethical, moral, and legal controls on medical and scientific
research and activity is as old, I suppose, as medical and scientific activity
itself. It certainly precedes the scientific age. It has probably always been
concerned in part with trying to determine when experiment has passed out
of that stage and has become therapy and treatment that is valid and
accepted. And it touches a number of areas.
The dramatic development of heart transplants really has brought nothing very new. There were kidney transplants and other organ transplants
before that, but they were perhaps less dramatic because of the sentiments
and the literature that is associated with the heart and which tends to confuse
the issues sometimes. There are also problems in areas in the use of drugs
that have been developed. As we know, historically, certain drugs appeared
to be a great boon to mankind and then side effects and other problems
emerged that were not anticipated, and great disasters resulted. I do not
know for certain, but I suspect that the tragic events surrounding the use of
thalidomide is a manifestation of that problem. It is sometimes suggested
that the matter of genetic management or manipulation may produce a new
crisis in law, science, and medicine but I rather tend to doubt that. I rather
think the problem of genetic management is so completely subjected to the
control of the young ladies and gentlemen of the future that we can safely
leave it to them and we need not worry, as some writers have, that someone
is going to try to set out on some great isolated area to produce master
football players or a master race or even, perhaps, infallible judges. We have
done, up to this time in life, without infallible people and will continue to
do it. So, I do not think we need to worry about the genetic problem in that
sense. In reading the literature in this field, I find that there is a tendency
on the part of scientists, some scientists - a few and some doctors, only a
few - to consider the law a drag on scientific development. But I think on
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closer examination you would all agree that it is not really a drag, any more
than it ought to be. General Motors and the other automobile makers can
produce a car that can go 150 miles an hour, an ordinary stock car. But
society is not about to let them use it on the streets. We are going to hold
them to thirty or forty or sixty or seventy miles an hour, depending upon
the needs of the group, and so the mere fact that science and technology can
produce a certain result, produce a development, does not mean at all that
society must let it go unrestrained. So the complaint that the law does not
keep pace is not really a valid one, I submit. The law's assignment in society
is not one to anticipate needs. The law responds after a problem arises, and
that is as it should be. And that is probably best illustrated on the problems
of the need, to which Dr. Dubos has referred, of redefining death.
In the past there has been no particular need to be concerned about a
legal definition or a formula by which the law could say at this point death
occurs because it arose chiefly in the past in the area of determining who
was or was not a survivor for the purposes of inheriting property. And in
those cases there was specific evidence from medical men about physiological
conditions from which the triers of fact, jurors and judges, could conclude
that death occurred at some particular time and that one person died before
another. Now, new problems may arise, in the heart transplant area in
particular, since a man has only one heart, as distinguished from two kidneys
and other organs that have been transplanted. But I predict that the law
will have no great difficulty in adjusting itself and evolving rules that will
meet the problem.
For the scientist and the clinical experimenter these problems that I have
passed off rather lightly are not easy, and I do not mean to treat them lightly.
The successful experiment is hailed and the successful experimenter is a hero
to his patient, to the public, to everyone, as witness Dr. Barnard on television
programs everywhere. And he is a hero. But if all his patients had died
he would be the defendant in a series of lawsuits, and this is the unfortunate
collision that lawyers must face with the scientific world - that we come into
this problem only in the unsuccessful experiment, when we are faced with
anguished parents, anguished relatives who seek relief. Just as people go to a
physician to seek relief from pain, people go to lawyers and courts to seek
relief though it takes the form of money damages, which is a subject that
makes doctors and clinical experimenters shudder. But these restraints must
remain for the very reason, primarily, that Dr. Dubos has emphasized, that is,
the sanctity of human life, the sanctity of the individual. And so, it is rubric
that whenever these experiments are performed, of whatever kind, there must
be the informed consent of the subject. That would seem elementary and
yet there have been many tragic situations that show that some scientific
people have not been as sensitive to that as they might be. The law must
condemn the use as subjects of experiments, minor children for whom no
one can give a consent to experimental work; military men subject to military
discipline; and in a less dear area, medical students in medical schools, who
are both under an enormous influence from their mentors and so dedicated
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to medicine and the advancement of knowledge that their consent might not
be totally and completely informed.
So that the problem of law in this area is to try to make a valid judgment
as to what risks are tolerable, judged always by the heavy weight that must
be given to the sanctity of life and of the individual; and then try to shape as
we go along, a set of rules that will not interfere unduly with the valid
experiment and will permit it to go ahead.
I mentioned the genetic problem only briefly. It is, as I suggested, not
one that is going to give the law or, I think, the scientific world any great
trouble. As to each of these areas: the use of new drugs developed, the use
of new surgical techniques developed, any therapy that may come out of
experiments and study, the law must place reasonable restraints for the
protection of the individual. And in reading some of the literature over the
last few years, I was impressed that it was not always the lawyers and the
theologians and the philosophers who were emphasizing the importance of
the individual, the sanctity of the human being. You heard Dr. Dubos, a
great scientist and physician, emphasizing it. And in one of the last public
utterances of his life, Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, certainly one of the great
scientific figures of our time, had something very interesting to say and it
should not be lost by attempting to paraphrase it, and so I am going to
read it because it is so brief. This is comforting to me as a lawyer, to find
that a great scientist like Dr. Oppenheimer, just as Dr. Dubos has today, put
the emphasis on that aspect. He said this: "I believe that the strength and
the soundness of Christian sensibility and morality have changed the world
at least as much as technological development."
I suggest to you that that being the view of so many of the great figures
in the scientific world, the predictions of the collision and irreconcilable
conflicts between the law and medicine and science are overrated; and that
as we go forward one step at a time, science taking its step and the law
responding with its solution, we will have no conflicts and the law will not
really be an unreasonable drag on the development of new techniques or
new drugs that will benefit humanity.
Dr. Emil Mantini. I must confess that I would not have volunteered for
this assignment, because I feel I have no wisdom beyond that which I believe
is common property among surgeons. On the other hand, my work and
interest in human heart preservation has brought me at times to what, in the
near past, would have been considered to be the fringe of excess in experimental surgery; and for this reason the attitudes and the ideas of my colleagues
involved in the sciences, as well as the law, are of particular interest to me.
In theory, doctors are supposed to save and thus prolong life, not to take
life or to hasten death. In these exciting times, however, practice does not
always conform to this theory. In recent years there has been a remarkable
increase in technical achievements in surgery, particularly as related to transplantation of organs. This has resulted in an enormous increase in the power
of the physician and surgeon, which raises many questions that have never
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previously been posed. To quote another Frenchman, Rostand, "Science has
made us gods before we are even worthy of being men."
I think it is highly appropriate that seminars such as this should consist
of scientists, lawyers, and physicians. This is a new era that we have entered
into, and a new set of problems. Let me give you an example. It was only
a short time ago that the term "death" had a single meeting to all of us,
that was capable of absolute definition. But now, in the light of current
medical realities and the need for prompt removal of organs for transplantation, the moment of death is no longer lucidly definable. Based upon perspective, numerous definitions of death could emerge. There is the most
extreme variety of death: cytological death, meaning extinction of every living
body or organ cell. There is physiological death, meaning cessation of vital
functions. There is intellectual death, the inability to synthesize or assimilate
knowledge. There is spiritual death, theological death, and social death. Nou
the acceptance of the definition of death in its most extreme form, cytological
death, would of course preclude all possibility of successful organ transplantation. A minimum requirement for successful organ transplantation is cytological life, which in our times must somehow be couched in an acceptable
definition of death. Obviously, theological and philosophical concepts will
impinge upon a really scientific definition of death, and the problem of an
acceptable definition will require the collaborative and precise thinking of
physicians, lawyers, theologians, and philosophers. This is a new era with a
new set of problems and with new facts we must create new laws.
Social interests and expectations, if they are justified, will eventually be
reflected in the law. The law, it seems to me, has always attempted to steer
a middle course in its encounters with medicine; and it is not only proper,
but necessary that it continue to do so. Why is this necessary? Because with
the inception of each new human surgical procedure, a distinction between
what is experimental and what is therapeutic is unclear. No matter how
convincing the evidence of the efficacy of any given new surgical technique
worked out in the experimental animal surgical laboratory, the ultimate
necessary experiment is the application of this technique for the therapy of
a human disease. Therefore, the innovator must be given a certain latitude
in human experimentation. Past experiences have shown us that certain major
surgical advances have resulted from extending to humans operative proceures that were not imminently successful on the experimental animal. Let
me give you an example. Today, the replacement of damaged or destroyed
human heart valves by artificial prosthetic devices is a widely performed
operation that has resulted in a remarkable saving and prolongation of human
life. For years surgeons had attempted this operation in the experimental
animal, namely the dog, with very disappointing results. The problems of
blood clotting about the prosthesis seemed insurmountable. Yet in spite of
this background of discouraging experimental information, a group of surgeons implanted this same artificial valve in humans. The result was a highly
successful operation. It had been suspected, but never previously proved, that
the human would accept this artificial valve in a way that the dog could not.
It has been estimated that the progress of seven years of heart valve surgery
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were lost as the result of misleading animal experimentation. The application
of this now highly successful and useful operation might have been postponed
indefinitely had not some bold individual performed the final experiment,
namely, the implantation of the valve into a human heart. Human heart
transplantation as we view it today is performed for the acquisition of knowledge as well as with the intent and the reasonable hope of therapy, but remains in the twilight zone of the uncertain result. If human heart transplantation achieves wide clinical application, the problems related to the
acquisition, preservation, and disposition of available transplanted hearts will
tax the imagination, the conscience, and the judgment of scientists, lawyers.
clergymen, and physicians for many years to come.
The point, I believe, is that the law can and must come to recognize a
rate of ethical experimentation on human beings, as it has thus far in the
Nuremburg Code and the Declaration of Helsinki. And the law can yield
in its absolutes, where the risk may jeopardize life, for the sake of humanity.
Dr. Samuel P. Martin. It is a real honor for me to participate in this
dedication. I believe that this building and the work that will go on here
in this building will lead to some change in our social order. I hope and feel
that this law school has the potential to create changes in our society
equivalent to those brought about by the biological and physical sciences
during the last half century. I would like to direct my remarks to a special
field of biology, which is called "ethology" and some of its impact on our
thinking and the law.
This field deals with the biological basis of behavior. Great strides are
now being made in this area. If we look back and see the impact that Darwin
had on his society when he challenged the world with his origin of the species,
that impact will be small compared with the impact that this field of biology
will have when it elucidates the behavior of the species. Ethology is rapidly
unfolding for us a view of the biological determinants of behavior. Questions
are being asked and answered daily in this field. How much of man's behavior
is being determined by in-built genetic and metabolic patterns? How much
has come about through operant conditioning at an unconscious level? And
finally, how much operates at a level where there is conscious and understanding control? These questions are rapidly being elucidated by the scientists
working in this field. Dr. Dubos elucidated or cleared in my mind and pointed
out to you the fact that there is a social evolution and that this is moving
forward on a behavior basis. In the area of genetic and metabolic patterns
we have been shocked recently by the postulated criminal behavior associated
with the XY chromosomes system. In animals and in man there are known
brain metabolic mechanisms that control behavior. In the past in man we
have taken a simplistic and agnostic view of instincts and inherited patterns
of behavior. As we better understand behavior, our skepticism may be
altered. Chemical control of behavior is already with us. The influence
of drugs such as LSD and others on behavior is well known. The chemical
mechanism of memory is rapidly being unfolded. There are experiments
showing that the biologist can actually transfer behavior from one animal
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to another by nucleic adds. There is little doubt that new drugs will be
created that will influence memory as well as behavior, and may be even
capable of erasing memory. In the area of operant conditioning and its influence on behavior, Dr. Skinner has opened our eyes to the fact that man's
behavior is susceptible to major modifications without his knowledge. The
techniques of Skinner have been applied recently to socialize mentally
defective children. These children, operating at a vegetative level, have been
rapidly changed to become acceptable as responsible members of society,
even with their limited intellect. More recently, these techniques have been
introduced in the public schools to hasten learning, particularly with the slow
or culturally deprived child. Skinner has used these techniques to change
the behavioral pattern of delinquent children. It is easy to observe that a
man or a child placed in the operant behavior conditioning situation, acquires
first a new facial tic or a body tic or mannerism, then later a major behavioral
alteration. The individual is totally unaware of the acquisition of this new
pattern of behavior, much less understanding its cause. Thus, new patterns
of behavior can be given to man without his knowledge or control. This
gives us the view that maybe society can, through operant conditioning, alter
a pattern of behavior without recognition.
If one observes the primate studies of Harlow on mothering he finds that
they are equally challenging. Monkeys brought up with a cloth mother can
be given lifetime behavioral patterns by simple environmental manipulations.
From these studies it is obvious that in the next few years the ethologist will
begin to sort out many behavioral patterns in man that are inherited genetic
patterns and many others that are acquired at a level outside the control of
the individual or outside the conscious control of his society.
As these are understood, they become a real challenge. The law must
consider the inevitable actions of man and his controlling mechanisms over
certain aspects of his behavior. It would seem that the law could profitably
work with biology to develop some new ways of approaching these problems.
It will also become important to develop attitudes, systems to use, and methods
to control the power of operant conditioning.
Since man can be so easily conditioned, these techniques are successful
and have been used so successfully with the rehabilitation of the mentally
retarded. They will obviously be extended very quickly into our criminal
punishment and rehabilitation. They could possibly creep into many other
aspects of our social behavior. What right does one man have to program
the behavior of another? What right does one man have to alter the memory
of another? With this new understanding of the biological basis of behavior
must come a system to control the manipulations and the manipulator. The
right of the individual and the right of society must be protected, but the
fabulous potential of this field of biology to create a better world must also
not be neglected.
Pandora's box has truly been opened in the behavioral area. Our first
speaker, Dr. Dubos, recently told an international gathering of scientists, and
I will quote him: "We must not ask where science and technology are taking
us, but rather how we can manage science and technology so that they can
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help us to get where we want to go." We can no longer ignore the social
value of behavioral biology. The law must join biology and medicine to
become an experimental arm of the social and behavioral sciences. Law must
move from its sheltered position of retrospection and description into the
perilous position of prospection and experimentation. Through wisdom and
leadership in law, modern science and biology can be managed to take us
where we want to go.
Dr. Marcus L. Plant. May I express my appreciation at having the opportunity to participate in this program. I consider it a high privilege with the
vistas that have been suggested by our preceding speakers. There is no
question that there are many challenges in the future to the law. But I would
like to focus, during my remarks, on the theme of Judge Burger, that the law
is not, and is not likely to be a drag on medical progress; and relate some
of my remarks also to Dr. Mantini's statements concerning experimentation.
I want to center this around a specific problem. The literature in this
area evidences a deep preoccupation with the idea of informed consent. This
is a term that has become quite popular in the last fifteen years. It is not a
term of art in the sense that it has a long tradition of meaning. It is something
of a journalistic term and for that reason it has, by loose use, brought a great
deal of confusion into the thinking of lawyers and judges and alarm into
the thinking of physicians and scientists. Here, I believe, a careful analysis
of the nature of informed consent can dispel at least a good deal of the
misunderstanding. Let me do it in this fashion.
There are three different types of situations in which this concept functions. The first is a very elementary one. If there are any law students here
who started law study last September, they understand it. It is the idea that
the physician may not treat the patient unless the patient consents to be
treated. If the physician misleads the patient, if he treats him without his
consent as to what is to be done, if he misleads him as to the nature and
character of the touching, he is liable for what is called "assault and battery."
If, however, he misleads him and obtains his consent by misrepresentation
or a failure to disclose the collateral hazards he then exposes himself to
liability for negligence. Now even these simple ideas have been subject to
some confusion in some of the courts, although there is a more than thirtypage discussion appearing in the May 1968 issue of the Fordham Law Review,
which this speaker believes will clear this up permanently.
The second category of cases in which determined informed consent is
involved, and in which the term "experimentation" appears, is the case in
which a physician-patient relationship exists and the physician is attempting
to aid the patient. His purpose is therapeutic. He has used all the standard
procedures and they have failed. There is an unconventional procedure that
he believes might help. At least he believes it is worth a try but it has
some danger. For a long time the law has recognized that in this situation,
if the patient is informed fully of the need for the new procedure, the unconventional procedure, and if the dangers of it are fully explained to him,
the physician may proceed to use it. And even though it fails and there is a

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol21/iss4/1

12

Jones et al.: The New Biology and the Law
1969]

THE NEW BIOLOGY AND THE LAW

disaster the physician does not incur liability. This is what is frequently
referred to as "experimentation." In a certain sense I believe it is, but it
is a certain type of experimentation, namely, beneficial or therapeutic experimentation. An excellent illustration is the one that Dr. Mantini gave of the
use of a new procedure in repairing damaged heart tissue. There again, I
think the cases are fairly dear and that physicians do this with relative
freedom from liability.
The third situation is the one that has been raised by the new biology.
It is the case in which a human being is being used as the subject of an
experiment for a nontherapeutic purpose. The purpose is to acquire knowledge, not to cure him. The horror of the world at some of the wrongdoings
of the Nazi physicians started a series of declarations. I will not name them
but I have a list of about a dozen here, starting with the Nuremburg Code
and ending with one of the most recent - the Declaration of Helsinki. All
of these involve the notion that the experiment must be a scientifically
desirable one, and that the patient's informed consent must be secured.
There has been a great deal of discussion on this, a great deal of writing.
And there is not any question that a high level of thinking has gone into it.
And yet we should also take account of the fact that in certain areas the
medical profession has not followed these codes and there have been cases
that in my judgment are quite reprehensible and that incur legal liability.
I will mention just one or two of those. Perhaps you may be familiar with
the report, the article that was made by Dr. Henry Beecher who was a
professor of research and anesthesia at Harvard, in the New England Journal
of Medicine. He gives a list there of twenty-two experiments, and he says
he could have put in more but that he was confined by space, which were
serious in nature and in which, he suggests and states plainly in some
instances, no consent was given or the consent that was given was given on
the'basis of misrepresentation. For example, Example 16, "This study," he
says, "was directed toward determining a period of infectivity of infectious
hepatitis. Artificial induction of hepatitis was carried out in an institution
for mentally defective children, in which a mild form of hepatitis was endemic.
The parents gave consent for the use of muscular injection or oral administration of the virus, but nothing was said regarding what was told them concerning the appreciable hazards involved." Another one, Example 18, was this:
"Melanoma was transplanted from a daughter to her volunteering and
informed mother in the hope that the production of tumor antibodies might
be helpful in the treatment of the patient. Since the daughter died on the
day after the transplant of the tumor into the mother the hope expressed
seems to have been more theoretical than practical, and the daughter's condition was described as terminal at the time the mother volunteered to be a
recipient. The primary implant was widely excised on the twenty-fourth day
after it had been implanted in the mother. She died from metastic melanoma
on the 451st day after transplantation. The evidence that this patient died
of diffuse melanoma that metasticized from a small piece of transplanted
tumor was considered conclusive." Twenty-two such examples then, and of
course we are all familiar, I imagine, with the case in New York in which
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physicians injected live cancer cells into the tissues of twenty-two aged
hospital patients who were not suffering from cancer, in order to test the speed
with which antibodies might develop, and the subjects were only told that
they were being used to test immunity to disease. The word "cancer" was not
mentioned, and one of the physicians who did it said he omitted reference
to the word because he was afraid that it would alarm his patients.
So that there appear to be two currents of thought in the profession.
One is at the level of the philosopher and the formulator of principles; but
there is a considerable segment, or has been in the past, of this kind of nontherapeutic experimentation in which the informed consent of the patient
was very dubious and quite often absent.
The law is quite clear as to some of these. So far, I think, as the heart
transplants are concerned there is no authoritative case as yet although I
understand there is one case in California at the lower court level in which
the relatives of the deceased donor are bringing an action because their
consent was not procured. But here you have the category that I have put
second; that is to say, the therapeutic purpose. If the donee has the matter
fully explained to him and if he is willing to take the risk, I do not see that
there is any great danger so far as he is concerned or so far as the physician
is concerned with respect to action or liability to his survivors. There is the
problem of the donor, as to when he has died, and even then, as to whether
the consent of his survivors has been procured. Some of these problems can
be eliminated by the adoption of the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, and I
think there would be no trouble in working out statutes to take care of that.
The editors of the American Bar Association Journal in an editorial in
November 1968, made that point in which they said as Judge Burger did,
that there is no definite way now of determining when death occurs, but
that they do not doubt that a statute could be formulated with the cooperation
of the two disciplines, which would clear up that problem. So far as the
nontherapeutical experiments are concerned, I think generally the ethical
writers agree with Judge Burger that children, particularly children who are
institutionalized, ought not to be used unless perhaps the experiment has to
do with their disability, in which case it takes on something of a therapeutic
nature; that medical students ought not to be used; military men ought not
to be used. I have grave doubt, and I think some of the leaders of thinking
have grave doubt, as to whether prisoners ought to be used because there,
while informed and consent is given, there are the pressures that come from
the fact that the individual is in his handicapped position and hopes that
it may help him to regain his freedom. I think there is another area in which
nontherapeutical clinical investigation is dangerous and ought to be stopped
if one has the opportunity to do so, and that is where there is substantial
likelihood that the procedure will cause serious bodily harm or death. There
are numerous areas in the law that do not permit a person to consent to his
own injury. Suicide was a crime in common law and in some states attempted
suicide is still a crime today. A woman cannot consent to an abortion.
Consent given by an ordinary individual to a substantial injury to his body
for nontherapeutic purposes may constitute the crime of maiming. It seems
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to me that a procedure such as the transplant of the melanoma in the case
mentioned by Dr. Beecher is a flagrant violation of the moral and legal
principles of Western civilization and that the perpetrators are not really
much different than the Nazis who were hanged at Nuremburg.
I think one other matter needs mention, and here again I do not see a
legal solution as things stand at the moment. And that is the case in which
medicines or drugs are given to people who are the subjects of the experiments. They understand that they are getting some sort of medical tratment,
but a good many of the administrations are of a placebo, and the fact that an
individual may be receiving a placebo is concealed from him. Now this is
justified sometimes on the ground that the ignorance of the recipient of the
administration is essential to the soundness of the experiment. I think that,
regardless of that, it constitutes legally a classical case of deceit as to the
nature of the treatment that is being given him and would expose a physician
clearly to libabity. I understand that there are some differences of opinion
on this in the National Institute of Health.
So that in summary, my thoughts are that there are some fairly determinable rules if we will analyze our terms, if we will analyze what kind of a
situation we are working in, whether it is an ordinary physician-patient
relationship or whether it is an investigator-subject relationship. One of the
physicians who injected the cancer cells in the patients in New York indicated
in his testimony before the disciplinary board, that he thought he was in a
physician-patient relationship with those people. He said, "They think
of me as a doctor, I think of myself as a doctor." Although he had no part in
their attempting to cure their disease, he was merely carrying this out for
scientific purposes. There is a distinction that I think ought to be drawn, and
if that distinction is made, plus the distinction as to the nature of the informed
consent we are seeking, quite a few of the theoretical legal problems would
disappear. The ethical problems may still remain, but the legal problems
are not such as, in Judge Burger's word, to constitute a drag on medical
progress.
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